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Legal scholars, lawyers, and judges frequently make positive claims about the state of legal 
doctrine. Yet despite the profligate citation norms of legal writing, these claims are often 
supported in a somewhat imprecise way – where the exact evidence is unclear or difficult for 
others to probe or falsify. In response to similar issues, other disciplines have developed 
methodological standards for conducting “systematic reviews” that summarizes the state of 
knowledge on a given subject. In this essay we argue that methods for performing systematic 
reviews that are specifically tailored to legal analysis should be developed. We purpose a simple 
four-step process that could be used whenever someone is trying to make objective claims about 
the state of legal doctrine and illustrate the value of method by applying it to doctrinal claims 
that have been made in recent legal scholarship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Legal scholars, advocates, and judges commonly make positive claims about the state of legal 
doctrine. For example, a legal scholar might claim that there is a trend in recent federal court 
decisions to allow a particular pretrial procedure or a judge might claim that most courts endorse a 
given legal proposition. These claims, however, are frequently made without a systematic 
demonstration of supporting evidence. When this occurs, it not only makes it difficult for the reader 
to evaluate the validity of the claim, but it also may impede future legal analysis and allow for either 
conscious or unconscious bias.  
 In response to analogous concerns about their literature, other disciplines have developed 
rigorous methods for conducting “systematic reviews.” A systematic review is a method of 
summarizing the results of prior literature on a research question. Typically employed in the 
medical and psychological sciences, but increasingly being used in the social sciences, systematic 
reviews have four key lessons for doctrinal work. First, the researcher should state clearly the 
question she is attempting to answer as this affects the manner in which she conducts her 
review. Second, the research must justify and be transparent about how she defines and obtains 
the sample for her review. Third, the research ought to explain any weighting that is applied to 
the cases in the sample. Fourth, the researcher needs to justify and be transparent about the 
manner in which she analyzes the sample cases she reviews. Together these steps can prevent 
bias from case-selection and improve the legitimacy of conclusions drawn from the review. 
 In this essay we argue that legal scholars, lawyers, and judges should conduct a four step 
systematic review when they are making positive claims about the state of legal doctrine. In Part I we 
survey the lack of systematic support for positive claims and explain the benefits of greater 
methodological rigor. In Part II we discuss systematic reviews in other fields and their applicability 
to legal analysis. In Part III we propose a four-step process for conducting systematic review of legal 
doctrine and then demonstrate its use by applying it to recently made doctrinal claims. Finally, we 
conclude discussing the areas that we believe would benefit most from the application of our 
proposed method.  
 
 
I. THE CASE FOR INCREASED RIGOR 
 
 We begin by surveying unsystematic claims about the state of legal doctrine, then go on 
to explain why, even if the claims are true, there are still benefits to more systematic review.  
  
A. Examples  
 
Lawyers regularly make claims about the law, and in particular about case law. Indeed, it 
might be one of the research tasks that they are most frequently paid to do. And while much 
legal scholarship is more normative, claims about the law are still prevalent. For example, a civil 
procedure scholar may argue that a particular rule for class action cases is the increasingly 
prevailing view in federal courts, or a public law scholar may discuss the administrability 
problems created by a trend in state constitutional law. Yet those scholars might point to only 
two or three cases as evidence of the trend, and with no information about the universe from 
which they were chosen. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811771 
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These are not just hypothetical examples—both are from recent law review articles. We 
stress that in each case, the authors may well be right. Indeed, we have no particular reason to 
doubt that these experts in their field are wrong. And by describing these examples, we do not 
mean to criticize them for failing to adhere to an existing standard of proof or citation (which is 
why we do not name them here). In fact, our argument is that these examples are not unique, 
and instead illustrative of a broad pattern.  
 To get a better sense of what kind of evidence is provided to establish legal claims, we 
reviewed every article published in the last completed volume of ten top law reviews.4 For each 
article, we had a research assistant read the abstract and record any claim about the state of legal 
doctrine.5 The research assistant then read the article and recorded the evidence that was 
provided as support for those claims. Finally, we coded the support provided for the doctrinal 
claim into one of three categories:  citing to 1 case or less for support; citing to multiple cases as 
support; or conducting some form of a systematic review (that is, define the entire set of cases that 
was relevant to the claim and the evidence to support it). 
 The results of this research are presented in Table 1. Our analysis suggested that roughly 
50% (69 of 139) of articles included a claim about the state of legal doctrine in the abstract. Of 
these 69 articles, only about 20% (14 of 69) provided any form of systematic review to support 
the doctrinal claim. The rest of the articles provided string cites to cases (and occasionally, 
academic articles as well), but did not explain how they identified the universe of cases or 
whether they are representative.   
This strikes us as suboptimal. The norms of citation in legal academia ought to be 
designed to give non-expert readers a chance to test those claims, and a sense of how much 
confidence those claims deserve. Again, we do not fault anybody for failing to adhere to a norm 
that does not yet exist. But our suggestion is that it would be good for legal academia to develop a 
standard that helps legal analysts more rigorously see and more persuasively show what the law 
is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
4 We set out to analyze the flagship law reviews of the 10 highest ranked schools in the 2015 U.S. 
News and World Report ranking of law schools. Because the flagship journals of two schools—the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review and University of Virginia Law Review—did not consistently have 
abstracts for their articles, we skipped these schools in our analysis and moved to the next schools 
on the list.  
5 We focused on doctrinal claims made in the abstract because our goal was to identify doctrinal 
claims that were central to the articles argument.  
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Table 1: Support for Doctrinal Claims in Recent Volume of 10 Major Law Reviews 
   Support for the Doctrinal Claim 
Journal 
Articles 
in the 
Volume 
Doctrinal 
Claims in 
Abstract 
≤ 1 
Case 
Multiple 
Cases 
Systematic 
Review 
California Law Review (vol. 115) 14 4 1 3 0 
Columbia Law Review (vol. 103) 10 5 1 3 1 
Duke Law Journal (vol. 65) 16 8 0 6 2 
Harvard Law Review (vol. 129) 7 3 0 3 0 
Michigan Law Review (vol. 114) 18 12 0 10 2 
Northwestern U. Law Review (vol. 110) 11 9 0 6 3 
NYU Law Review (vol. 90) 17 10 0 9 1 
Stanford Law Review (vol. 67) 13 4 2 1 1 
Univ. of Chicago Law Review (vol. 82) 17 7 0 4 3 
Yale Law Journal (vol. 124) 16 7 0 6 1 
Total 139 69 4 51 14 
 
 Although this analysis focused on legal scholarship, we also see the same problems in 
more formal academic output, the Restatements of Law published by the American Law 
Institute. The Restatements have long been an important and widely-cited resource in American 
law,6 and a recent volume has been given “the highest praise” for its “clear and careful 
exposition of the law.”7 
 But that very same volume has proven controversial in the courts. In a recent Supreme 
Court case, the Justices divided over whether to accept a special master’s decision that had relied 
heavily on the Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.8 The majority adopted 
the master’s recommendation, repeatedly citing the Restatement,9 while the dissent complained 
that the Restatement “lacks support in the law,” would “alter the doctrinal landscape of contract 
law,” and had not been relied on by courts.10  
                                            
6 Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 510 n.35 (2006) (“[C]ourts 
continue to treat the Restatements as presumptively accurate summaries of general American 
jurisprudence.”). See also Bennett Boskey, The American Law Institute A Glimpse at Its Future, 12 GREEN 
BAG 2d 255, 258 (2009). 
7 Ben Kremer, Book Review, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 1197, 1215 (2011) (praising Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011)); Lionel Smith, Book Review, 57 MCGILL L.J. 629, 633 
(2012) (same). 
8 Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. 1042 (2015). 
9 Id. at 1056-57, 1058. 
10 Id. at 1068-69 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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 Justice Scalia wrote separately to criticize the Restatement even more pointedly. 
“[M]odern Restatements,” he said, “must be used with caution.”11 They “have abandoned the 
mission of describing the law,” and contain provisions “that should be given no weight whatever 
as to the current state of the law.” Hence, he concluded, “it cannot safely be assumed, without 
further inquiry, that a Restatement provision describes rather than revises current law.”12 
 The power of these criticisms is exacerbated by the vague methodological ambitions of 
the Restatements. The Restatements purport to “reflect the law as it presently stands or might 
appropriately be stated by a court.”13 To the extent this methodology is descriptive, the 
restatements tell us little about how to test their validity or know when to trust them. But  some 
Restatement reporters are trying to do better: For instance, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar and 
Florencia Murotta-Wurgler are writing a new Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts using 
principles analogous to the ones we discuss here.14 This is a great step. Our goal is to assist this kind 
of endeavor and encourage more of them.15 We hope that these principles of systemic analysis can 
help.  
 
B. The Value of a More Rigorous Approach  
 
  Even if a given claim about legal doctrine is correct, that there are benefits to establishing 
the claim in a more rigorous way. We will briefly mention five.16  
 First, a more rigorous demonstration of evidence makes it easier for readers to evaluate 
whether the ultimate claims are true or false. When less comprehensive support is provided, 
readers instead rely on their outside knowledge or rely on the author’s credibility as evidence for 
the validity of the claim. Expecting readers to rely on these proxies is problematic because not 
everyone will have the same outside knowledge or view of the author’s reputation. Using 
reputation as a proxy also invites ad hominem attacks on the author’s credibility. 
 Second, a more rigorous demonstration of evidence makes it easier for readers to assess 
how much uncertainty is associated with a given claim. For example, it may be true that courts 
                                            
11 Ironically, the one original Restatement that Justice Scalia cited as an example of trustworthy craft 
– the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws – is one that had been singled out for opprobrium by a 
recent officer at the American Law Institute. See Boskey, supra note 6, at 257 (“[T]he judiciary and 
the bar welcomed the help of most of the Restatement First (possibly excepting the Restatement of 
the Conflict of Laws, for which the ideologically-imprisoned Professor Joseph H. Beale had been 
the reporter).”). 
12 Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
13 https://www.ali.org/publications/frequently-asked-questions/#differ (emphasis added). 
14 See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Murotta-Wurgler, Searching for the Common 
Law: The Empirical Approach of the Consumer Contracts Restatement, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming).  
15 Cf. Jay M. Feinman, The Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance As A Restatement: An Introduction to 
the Issue, 68 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 1, 8 (2015) (noting a recent ALI discussion reacting to Justice 
Scalia’s criticisms). 
16 These benefits largely parallel the arguments that have been used to motivate the transparency and 
replication movement that has been taking place in the social sciences. See generally Lee Epstein & 
Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38-54 (2002).  
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generally agree on a point of law, but valuable to know how many cases have disagreed. 
Similarly, it is valuable to know whether a trend has been shown only in certain courts, or in 
certain years. This evidence helps a reader understand the degree of uncertainty associated with a 
claim and also know the scope conditions of when that claim is valid.  
 Third, providing more complete support for claims can reduce error. Even authors who 
are fairly confident in their knowledge make mistakes. When authors undertake to demonstrate 
their work, they will be less likely to make a mistakenly false statement. This logic has been one 
of the reasons that quantitative researchers are increasingly expected to provide their data and 
code. Simply put, the original researcher will be more careful when they know it will be easier 
for future researchers to double check their work.  
Fourth, more complete documentation of support increases general progress in the field. 
Both common law legal reasoning and research are social enterprises in that they build on the 
work from the past. When authors do not document the support for their claim, however, 
people trying to answer the same question in the future have to recreate their work. Because 
research is a social enterprise, research norms should support this kind of documentation, just as 
journals and funding agencies increasingly require empirical researchers to publish their data. 
 Fifth, providing such demonstrations can help to reduce actual or perceived bias. A large 
body of scholarship has studied the role that political ideology has on legal decision making. 
This literature has consistently found that the political views of judges predict their decisions,17 
and more recently has even found the political views of law professors predict the conclusions 
they reach in their scholarship.18 One way to help reduce the risk or perception of bias is to 
provide the evidence that the claim is based on.  
 
 
II. SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 
 
In this Part, we discuss the history and justifications for systematic review, explain the 
steps of systematic reviews, and discuss why or why not it might be an appropriate model for 
doctrinal work. The last step is the most critical, as systematic review is not a perfect fit for 
doctrinal work and so only steps that are profitably imported into analysis of case law should be 
recommended. 
 
A. History and Justification 
 
The sciences, especially the biological and psychological sciences, have long recognized 
the need for a methodology to synthesize the results of prior research on a scientific question. 
An individual study may have a limited sample and thus statistical power to answer a research 
question. Moreover, its specific conclusions may be bound by the specific circumstances in 
which it was conducted. By contrast, a review could aggregate the data and contexts from 
                                            
17 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 
2197 (2009).  
18 Adam Chilton & Eric Posner, An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship, 44 J. LEGAL. 
STUD. 277 (2015). 
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multiple studies to yield both a more precise and generalizable study.19 The intellectual challenge 
of finding a method to combine results from multiple studies has long attracted the attention of 
leading statisticians, including Karl Pearson and Sir Ronald Fisher in the early twentieth 
century.20 A famous early example is Pearson’s effort to synthesize a number of studies that 
examined the value of enteric fever inoculation in 1904.21  
Demand for a method for synthesizing studies was initially limited, however, because 
there were simply too few medical studies conducted to be synthesized and because medical 
practice was informal and decentralized. As reliable research designs developed—especially the 
randomized controlled trial—and computing power increased, more and more primary research 
was conducted.22 Moreover, in the 1970s, a movement emerged that argued that medical 
practice should be driven by research evidence and not physicians’ idiosyncratic personal 
experiences or hunches.23 
One of the principle products of the evidence-based medicine movement is the 
Cochrane Collaboration, which promotes the development of a rigorous methodology for 
synthesis, also known as “systematic reviews,” and hosts an online database of reviews of prior 
research.24 The need to define best practices for systematic reviews is now embraced widely in 
the medical literature, which has generated consensus statements on how such reviews ought to 
be conducted.25 
The primary alternative methodology to the systematic review is the narrative review. A 
narrative review is mainly qualitative, critical examination of the prior literature on a subject. The 
main criticism of this methodology—and thus the justification for systematic reviews—is that 
the authors have discretion to select which medical studies they review and how they interpret 
the studies they select. This discretion can lead to confirmation bias—authors select articles that 
                                            
19 See Amit X. Garg, et al., Systematic Review and Meta-analysis: When One Study Is Just not Enough, 3 
CLINICAL JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEPHROLOGY 253, 254 (2008); J.C. Valentine, 
T.D. Pigott, & T. Lau, Systematic reviewing and meta-analysis, in J. Wright, e.d., INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 2ND ED, 906 (2015).  
20 See RJS Simpson & Karl Pearson, Report on certain enteric fever inoculation statistics, 3 BRITISH MEDICAL 
JOURNAL 1243 (1904) (an early effort to combine results from different sources); Ronald Aylmer 
Fisher, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS 99 (1925) (“…it sometimes happens that 
although few or [no statistical tests] can be claimed individually as significant, yet the aggregate gives 
an impression that the probabilities are lower than would have been obtained by chance”). 
21 Pearson, supra note 20, at 1235.  
22 Valentine et al., supra note 19, at 908.  
23 Archibald Cochrane, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: RANDOM REFLECTIONS ON HEALTH 
SERVICES (1972). 
24 See The Cochrane Collaboration, http://www.cochrane.org (accessed April 17, 2016).  
25 See, e.g., David Moher, et al., Improving the quality of reports of meta-analyses of randomised controlled trials: 
the QUOROM statement, 354 THE LANCET (1999); D. F. Stroup, et al., Meta-analysis of observational 
studies in epidemiology: A proposal for reporting, 283 JAMA (2000) (for observational studies); David 
Moher, et al., Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement, 
151 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1299, 1300 (2009). 
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tend to reinforce the author’s priors.26 Moreover, the narrative review does little to address the 
problem of publication bias, which is the tendency for papers with less interesting results—
usually results showing no effect, also known as null results—not to be published.27 This 
omission leads to overestimates of correlations, which often means the reviews will conclude 
treatments have effects even when they actually may not.28  
 
B. Steps in a Systematic Review 
 
Systematic reviews address these biases with four basic steps. First, a review’s author 
clearly defines the question she seeks to answer.29 For example, what is the value of bariatric 
surgery for reducing obesity?30 This helps ensure that the author stays on target when searching 
for relevant literature. Although it may be too obvious to need stating, a major cause of bias is 
an author answering a different question than the one that motivated a review.31  
Second, the author conducts an exhaustive search for relevant studies. In order for 
readers to judge how well the search was done, the author should be explicit about the databases 
searched, the search terms used, and any inclusion or exclusion criteria applied.32 The latter are 
criteria that determine whether a study falls within the ambit of their search or is to be dropped 
because it does not.33 Disclosures about the search methods also allow the reader to judge the 
potential for bias in the review34 and the development of “best practices” for search. The 
                                            
26 Julia H. Littell, Evidence-based or biased? The quality of published reviews of evidence-based practices, 30 
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REVIEW 1299, 1300 (2008); Garg et al., supra note 19, at 253. 
27 See, e.g., Phillipa J. Easterbrook, et al., Publication bias in clinical research, 337 THE LANCET (1991); 
Jerome M Stern & R John Simes, Publication bias: evidence of delayed publication in a cohort study of clinical 
research projects, 315 BMJ (1997). 
28 LM Schmidt & PC Gotzsche, Of mites and men: reference bias in narrative review articles: a systematic review, 
54 THE JOURNAL OF FAMILY PRACTICE (2005) (finding narrative reviews are overly positive in their 
assessments of treatments relative to systematic reviews and clinical trials). 
29 See, e.g., Khalid S. Khan, et al., Five steps to conducting a systematic review, 96 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL 
SOCIETY OF MEDICINE 118, at 118, 119 (2003); Denise O’Connor, Sally Green and Julian PT 
Higgins, Defining the review question and developing criteria for including studies, in Julian PT Higgins and 
Sally Green, eds. COCHRANE HANDBOOK FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS OF INTERVENTIONS: THE 
COCHRANE BOOK SERIES 83 (The Cochrane Collaboration 2008); Valentine et al., supra note 19, at 
910. 
30 H. Buchwald, et al., Bariatric surgery: A systematic review and meta-analysis, 292 JAMA 1724 (2004). 
31 Mark Crowther, et al., Systematic review and meta-analysis methodology, 116 BLOOD 3140, 3141 (2010). 
32 See, e.g., Khan et al., supra note 29, at 118, 119-20; Carol Lefebvre, Eric Manheimer and Julie 
Glanville on behalf of the Cochrane Information Retrieval Methods Group, Searching for studies, in 
Higgins & Green, supra note 29, at 95; Julian PT Higgins and Jonathan J Deeks, Selecting studies and 
collecting data, in Higgins & Green, supra note 29, at 151. 
33 H. C. Van Spall, et al., Eligibility criteria of randomized controlled trials published in high-impact general 
medical journals: A systematic sampling review, 297 JAMA (2007). 
34 Garg et al., supra note 19, at 253. 
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literature search step is crucial since an importance source of confirmation bias is the omission 
of relevant studies that may agree with the authors’ prior beliefs about the correct answer to 
their research question.35 
Third, the author appraises the quality of the studies that she has gathered.36 This is 
different than exclusion criteria, which are typically based on explicit criteria like whether the 
studies look at the right treatment, the target patient population, the intended outcome, etc. The 
quality appraisal looks instead at things like the methodology employed in the study (e.g., was an 
observational study or a randomized controlled trial37 or was double, single or not blinded38). 
This step is used to increase the weight of methodologically sound studies in the author’s 
subsequent synthesis of the evidence across studies. 
Finally, the author synthesized the results of the different studies that survive. The 
author should be explicit about the methodology she uses to synthesize the study.39 For 
example, she may use a voting method in which she simply counts the number of studies that 
find positive impacts of a treatment and that do not and reports what the majority of studies 
find, perhaps with different votes for different classes of studies where classes are defined by the 
quality of the study.40 She may be even more rigorous and extract the statistical results from each 
and combine them using meta-analysis, a quantitative methodology for combining summary 
statistics or even the data from multiple studies.41 The author should also be explicit about how 
                                            
35 See Littell, supra note 26, at 1300. Garg et al., supra note 19, at 256-57, also argue that more 
comprehensive searches also reduce the risk of publication bias. 
36 See, e.g., Khan et al., supra note 29, at 118, 120; Julian PT Higgins and Douglas G Altman on behalf 
of the Cochrane Statistical Methods Group and the Cochrane Bias Methods Group, Assessing risk of 
bias in included studies, in Higgins & Green, supra note 29, at 187. 
37 An observational study looks retrospectively at outcomes from treatments that patients chose 
while a randomized controlled trial randomly assigns patients to treatment to address selection bias. 
MIQUEL PORTA, et al., A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 203 (Oxford University Press, USA. 
2014).  
38 A single blind of the study subject prevents the subject from changing his behavior in response to 
the treatment, including dropping out of the study. Such behavior introduces selection effects either 
due to unobservable behavior while on treatment or unravels the benefit of random assignment. A 
single blind of the investigator prevents the investigator from seeing what treatment the patient 
received in order to limit the measurement error wherein the investigator measurement of (especially 
subjective) outcomes reflects her priors about the value of a treatment. A double blind study blinds 
both the subject and the investigator. See Porta et al., supra note 37, at 27. 
39 See, e.g., Khan et al., supra note 29, at 118, 121; Carol Lefebvre, Eric Manheimer and Julie Glanville 
on behalf of the Cochrane Information Retrieval Methods Group, Searching for studies, in Julian 
PT Higgins and Sally Green, eds., COCHRANE HANDBOOK FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS OF 
INTERVENTIONS: THE COCHRANE BOOK SERIES at 95 (The Cochrane Collaboration 2008). 
40 See Valentine et al., supra note 19, at 909. 
41 The term meta-analysis was coined by G.V. Glass and M.L. Smith, Meta-analysis of research on the 
relationship of class-size and achievement, 1 EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS 2 (1979). 
Details of how to conduct meta-analyses may be found in, e.g., Jonathan J Deeks, Julian PT Higgins 
and Douglas G Altman on behalf of the Cochrane Statistical Methods Group, Analysing data and 
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she thinks publication bias may affect the conclusions she is able to draw. Obviously, the better 
the method of synthesis the author employs, the better the review. However, being explicit 
about the method is almost as important as the method itself because it allows others to 
replicate the review author’s work, ensuring that the review was not manipulated and increasing 
confidence in the review’s conclusions.42  
 
C. An Appropriate Model for Doctrinal Work? 
 
Although much of the impetus for development of a methodology for systematic 
reviews comes from the biological and psychological sciences, it would seem to be of value to 
any field wherein there is a need for synthesizing the results from multiple inquiries into the 
same issue. One of the early converts to systematic reviews was the public policy literature, 
which set up the Campbell Collaboration to support and disseminate such reviews of policy 
interventions, especially in the fields of education, crime and justice, social welfare and 
international development.43 Efforts have also been made to import the methodology to 
management science44 and even software engineering.45 
It would seem that legal research, especially doctrinal work, would be a natural candidate 
for application of systematic reviews. As noted above, many scholars make descriptive claims 
about the law, and that work may be vulnerable to conscious or unconscious bias because the 
author neglects cases that do not fit.46 Readers of doctrinal work cannot assess any bias from 
this case selection process, and can compound the problem by citing uncritically the conclusions 
of the doctrinal analysis in their own legal analysis.  
The mere need to synthesize prior work, however, is not sufficient for justifying the 
wholesale importation of the methodology of systematic reviews. There are important difference 
between the medical sciences, for which the approach was developed, and doctrinal analysis. 
First, medical studies are quantitative while legal cases are qualitative. It is more difficult to 
aggregate or combine qualitative research. Second, medical studies have positive aims—figure 
out whether a treatment works or not—while legal analysis often embeds normative aims (e.g. 
like arguing that one rule is better than another).47  
                                                                                                                                             
undertaking meta-analyses, in Julian PT Higgins and Sally Green, eds., COCHRANE HANDBOOK FOR 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS OF INTERVENTIONS: THE COCHRANE BOOK SERIES at 243 (The Cochrane 
Collaboration 2008).  
42 See Valentine et al., supra note 19, at 911. 
43 See Campbell Collaboration, About us, 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/about_us/index.php (accessed on April 17, 2016).  
44 David Tranfield, et al., Towards a methodology for developing evidence-­‐informed management knowledge by 
means of systematic review, 14 BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 207 (2003). 
45 Jorge Biolchini, et al., Systematic review in software engineering, 679 SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND 
COMPUTER SCIENCE DEPARTMENT COPPE/UFRI, TECHNICAL REPORT ES (2005). 
46 See supra Part I.B.  
47 Similar arguments were made against the importation of systematic reviews into management 
science. See Tranfield, supra note 44, at 212.  
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These differences justify caution when translating elements of systematic reviews to 
doctrinal work, but do not necessarily justify ignoring entirely the lessons of the methodology. 
The fact that prior cases are qualitative does not at present prevent lawyers and legal academics 
from drawing conclusions from prior cases about what courts are likely to do in future cases. 
The lesson we should learn from systematic reviews is that even when conducting qualitative 
synthesis, an author should be clear about which cases made her sample. This will reduce the 
risk that the author draws incorrect conclusions because her qualitative synthesis ignored certain 
relevant cases, and allow future researchers to know where to expand on or replicate the 
author’s claims. She should also be clear about the sorts of logical steps she took when 
conducting her qualitative synthesis (e.g., what cases she valued more because of the judge or 
because the context was more generalizable).  
Likewise, the fact that legal work is often normative is not an argument against greater 
rigor during case selection and transparency about the nature of legal analysis. Indeed it is the 
opposite. Systematic review does not deny the need for normative work but rather clarifies the 
division between positive and normative by preventing an author from hiding normative analysis 
in work she is advertising as positive analysis. When an author wants to be normative, and this is 
appropriate, e.g., when she is writing a legal brief for a client, she should disclaim systematic 
review. When she seeks to be positive, she should embrace certain steps of systematic to lend 
her work legitimacy. Much scholarship and judicial writing aims to do both at the same time, and 
the steps of systemic review make it easier to tell which one the author is doing. 
 
 
III. DEVELOPING A METHOD OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEW FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this Part we first outline a process for how to conduct a systematic review of legal 
doctrine, and then provide an example of this process for a recent piece of legal scholarship.  
 
A. A Four-Step Process for Conducting a Systematic Review of Legal Doctrine 
 
We propose a four-step process for making claims about the state of legal doctrine: (1) 
clearly stating the legal question that is being answered; (2) defining the sample of cases that will 
be used; (3) explaining how the cases in the sample will be weighted; (4) conducting the analysis 
of the sample of cases and stating the conclusion. We briefly explain each of these four steps 
below.  
 
1. Stating the Question  
 
The first step in providing the evidence for a legal claim is defining the exact question 
that the subsequent analysis is trying to answer. There are two things to keep in mind at this 
stage.  
First, the question should be precise. The idea of stating a legal question will obviously 
be familiar to anyone in the legal profession. Legal questions are asked during Socratic cold calls 
during law school, used to motivate legal memos, and guide many forms of legal briefs. These 
questions, however, are often asked in a fairly broad manner. The key when asking a legal 
question to motivate a systematic review of legal doctrine is to make sure to state a question that 
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is sufficiently precise as to guide the time frame, jurisdictions, and relevant universe of cases that 
will be used to answer the question.  
Second, it is helpful to think about what evidence is required to establish a given claim. 
For example, if the question is how courts “typically” decide a particular type of case, answering 
the question requires knowing, say, the median way that courts have decided the case. Once 
again, knowing what evidence is required for the question helps to determine exactly what 
sample of cases are relevant and how to analyze them. Below we provide examples of common 
kinds of claims and the evidence they require.  
 
• Courts generally decide issue X in way Y. This kind of claim can be thought of as 
calling for the median outcome, or “majority rule” for a given kind of cases. To 
establish this kind of claim it is both necessary to establish the universe of 
relevant cases and to classify the outcomes of those cases in some way.  
• Courts have increasingly decided issue X in way Y. This kind of claim can be thought of 
as calling for the correlation of outcomes over time. To establish this kind of 
claim it is necessary to establish the universe of relevant cases, to classify the 
outcomes of those cases, and to make note of when those cases occurred.  
• There is a split in how courts decide issue X. This kind of claim can be thought of as 
making a claim about the variance of outcomes. Depending on the scope of this 
claim may be necessary to establish the universe of relevant cases and to classify 
the outcomes of those cases.  
• Courts have frequently confronted issue X. This can be thought of as a claim about the 
size of a given sample. Making this claim thus requires documenting the number 
of cases that meet the relevant criteria.  
• At least one court has decided issue X in way Y. This can be thought of as a claim about 
the existence of a given phenomenon. To establish this claim, it is not necessary 
to establish the universe of cases. Instead it is simply necessary to find one case 
that meets a given criteria.  
 
2. Defining the Sample of Cases 
 
After a question has been clearly stated, the next step is to define the relevant sample of 
cases that were analyzed. There are also two major steps to this process.  
First, it is important to establish what process was used to assemble the universe of 
cases. For example, one might say what courts one searched for cases from, and over what time 
period. This way it is possible for anyone else to understand exactly the universe of cases that 
was analyzed as support for a given doctrinal claim.  
Second, it is important to state any inclusion or exclusion criteria that were applied to a 
sample of cases. For example, if the universe includes a large number of cases, it is important to 
say which cases were analyzed. In some cases, the entire sample of cases may be analyzed, but in 
others it might be a random sample. Alternatively, it may be the case that certain kinds of cases 
are excluded from the analysis because they are not relevant (e.g., all potentially express 
preemption cases in an inquiry into field preemption). All of these decisions should be clearly 
documented.  
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Finally, in an ideal world (or if a process like ours begins to become more commonplace) 
one might also hope that analysts would specifically document the technology of their search 
process. For instance, they might say what databases they searched, using what terms, on what 
dates. This is considered an important step of systematic reviews in the medical literature. But 
we suspect that there may be more reluctance and resistance to translating it into legal 
scholarship. This is likely partly for reasons of style and etiquette, but also because the legal 
research process is more heterogeneous than the research processes in other disciplines. 
Although it would be beneficial if scholars documented this part of their process as well, it is not 
as important as clear definition of the universe of cases.  
 
3. Explaining the Weighting 
 
Once the sample of cases is established, it is important to state how the cases in the 
sample will be weighted in the analysis. Just as it may not be appropriate to give all clinical 
studies equal weight during a systematic review of the medical literature on a given subject if the 
quality of the studies differs, it may not be appropriate to give all cases the same weight. For 
instance, it may be appropriate to weight cases differently based on whether they are: of 
different precedential status; more recent; cited more frequently or written by more frequently 
cited judges; or engage in more analysis on the relevant topic. Once again, the key is 
transparency. Legal analysis need not be the simple sum of equally weighted cases, but the 
weighting should be explained to readers.  
 
4. Conducting the Analysis and Stating the Conclusion 
 
The final step is analyzing the sample and answering the question posed. There are three 
pieces of information that should be provided about this process.  
First, one should provide the criteria that were used to analyze the cases. This may be as 
simple saying “I counted any cases that mentioned issue X as relevant” or “I only counted cases 
as relevant if the central issue of the case was X.” 
 Second, one should say how the cases were analyzed. For example, one approach may be 
to conduct a key word search over a set of cases, but another would be to carefully read all of 
the relevant cases.  
Third, a conclusion should be stated that is not broader than what the evidence can 
support. For example, if the only federal district court opinions from 2010 to 2015 were 
analyzed during this process, the conclusion that follows is that “district court decisions between 
2010 to 2015 handle issue X in way Y” and not “courts handle issue X in way Y”. To be sure, 
scholarship frequently asks readers to make inferences from one set of data points to a broader 
one—the fact that a certain set of decisions handle issue X in way Y may be argued to imply that 
other courts do so as well. But once again, a clear analysis should make clear what claim is being 
made about the cases and what the requested inference is. 
 
B. A Sample Review 
 
 We hope that this four-step process can serve as a relatively simple way to advance the 
rigor—and hence the credibility and transparency—of doctrinal analysis. In their own work, 
Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar and Florencia Murotta-Wurgler are using a systematic review to 
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write a Restatement,48 and we applaud the effort. We think similar methods can add to the value of 
legal scholarship, and will try to demonstrate with a concrete example.  
One of us (Baude) previously published an article that investigated whether “originalism” 
is “our law,” in part through a synthesis of Supreme Court opinions.49 We think that the 
persuasiveness of that analysis might have been helped by the principles of systemic review. And 
so in the course of writing this article we decided to conduct a systemic review relevant to some 
of the claims in that article. Below, we describe the steps of that review and its results.  
 
1. Stating the Question 
  
One of the claims in the article was that the Supreme Court’s cases, with no exceptions 
or relatively few exceptions, were consistent with what Baude described as “inclusive 
originalism.”50 More specifically, it claimed: “First, in cases where the Court acknowledges a 
conflict between original meaning or textual meaning and another source of constitutional 
meaning, the text and original meaning prevail. Second, across the larger run of cases that do not 
feature an explicit clash of methodologies, the Court never contradicts originalism.”51 
To check this claim more systematically, we examined a set of 280 Supreme Court cases52 
with the help of a research assistant, and answered the following questions for each case:  
• Did the case decide a constitutional question? 
• If so, did the Court either reject the original meaning or say that the original meaning 
would not matter to its analysis? 
  
2. Defining the Sample 
 
The previous article attempted to focus on Supreme Court cases that reflect our current 
positive law commitments, which include both modern cases and older decisions that continue 
to be recognized as “canonical.”53 For purposes of our review, we focused on a subset of these 
cases and used a media salience metric called the “NYT Measure”: whether a case was listed on 
the front page of the New York Times.54 We defined the sample to include all 280 cases decided 
between 1989 and 2009 (the most recent period available). We then excluded the 84 cases that 
did not decide a constitutional issue.  
                                            
48 Supra note 14. 
49 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2370-2386 (2015). 
50 Id. at 2391. 
51 Id. at 2371. This was not the only claim in the article, but it is the one most immediately 
susceptible to systematic review. 
52 See infra Part III.B.2 for how we defined that sample. 
53 Baude, supra note 57, at 2371, 2391. 
54 The metric was developed by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey Segal, 
Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 73-81 (2000). The cases are available at 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/salience.xls. 
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This is of course an incomplete sample, and we note that several important cases 
discussed in the article55 did not appear in the dataset. But the metric is a “valid, reliable, and 
unbiased measure of salience,”56 and therefore useful for a systematic review of salient cases. 
 
3. Explaining the Weighting 
 
Our narrow definition of the sample to focus only on salient cases means that almost all 
cases that discussed the original meaning of a constitutional provision could get equal weight. 
However, depending on the specific question, it could be appropriate to give older cases or cases 
whose reasoning is partly repudiated or contested less weight in the final analysis.  
 
4. Conducting the Analysis 
 
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 2. Of the 196 constitutional law cases 
in our sample, our systematic review revealed only one in which the Court seemed to say that 
the original meaning of the constitutional provision (known or not) did not matter: Lawrence v. 
Texas. It is worth noting that this case was discussed at length in the original article.57  
Our review also uncovered eight other borderline cases: Allegheny County v. Pittsburgh58 
(since partly overruled by a 2014 decision59); Planned Parenthood v. Casey (also discussed at length 
in the article);60 BMW v. Gore;61 Kelo v. City of New London;62 and a string of Eighth Amendment 
cases involving “evolving standards of decency.”63 Each of these cases probably does not reject 
inclusive originalism,64 but presented a sufficiently close call that our review flagged them as 
unclear. This demonstrates an additional useful function of the review – identifying cases that 
might deserve further explanation—in addition to demonstrating one of the article’s claims in a 
more systematic way. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
55 See, e.g., Baude, supra note 57, at 2376 (discussing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004)). 
56 Epstein & Segal, supra note 54, at 72. 
57 Baude, supra note 57, at 2381-2382. 
58 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
59 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
60 Baude, supra note 57, at 2384. 
61 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
62 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
63 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, as modified 554 U.S. 945 
(2008). 
64 See, e.g., Baude, supra note 57, at 2356 n.24 (discussing Eighth Amendment). 
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Table 2: Systematic Review of Originalism in Salient Supreme Court Cases 
Period 
 
NYT 
Cases  
Decided 
Constitutional 
Question 
Rejects 
Original 
Meaning 
Borderline 
Case 
1989-1991 
 
73 54 0 1 
1992-1994 
 
46 28 0 2 
1995-1997 
 
37 28 0 1 
1998-2000 
 
38 25 0 0 
2001-2003  38 31 1 1 
2004-2006  26 18 0 2 
2007-2009 
 
22 12 0 1 
Total  280 196 1 8 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Although we believe that legal analysis could be improved if methodological standards 
for analyzing case law were developed, we acknowledge that our process has drawbacks. Most 
notably, documenting the steps we describe can consume time and space that could be spent on 
other things. Nor is systematic review appropriate for advocates making normative or 
proscriptive claims about what legal doctrine should be.  
 But we hope to convince others of the benefits of this framework when making positive 
claims about legal doctrine a central part of the analysis in law reviews, restatements, and judicial 
opinions. Law reviews articles provide research for lawyers, judges, and policymakers to rely on. 
They would be more useful—and perhaps more likely to be cited—if they provided all the 
evidence necessary to support their central claims. Systematic reviews could help the reporters 
of restatement alleviate the concern that they color their analysis to reach their desired 
conclusions. Systematic reviews could help courts by lending credibility and reducing any 
perception of bias about their decisions.  
 Even if many authors are reluctant to adopt these techniques directly, we believe their 
insights can be useful in other ways as well. For instance, for claims that are not central to an 
analysis, it still may be best to cite to secondary sources that did conduct a systematic review. 
This is because these sources would provide better evidence than articles that may have made 
the same claim while simply citing to other articles or legal materials. And when one is 
skeptically questioning a doctrinal claim that does not document its methodology, our 
framework may provide a useful point of departure—it can help critics and skeptics zero in on 
which part of an argument most needs to be supported and proven. 
 Finally, we emphasize that we recognize that there are many different ways to 
incorporate some of the insights of systematic reviews. We do not intend this essay to be the 
final statement on the matter, but instead hope to generate debate on how more rigorous 
methods can be incorporated into traditional legal analysis. 
 
 
